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The self-centeredness of modern organizations leads to environmental destruction and human 
deprivation. The principle of responsibility developed by Hans Jonas requires caring for the 
beings affected by our decisions and actions.  
 
Ethical decision-making creates a synthesis of reverence for ethical norms, rationality in goal 
achievement, and respect for the stakeholders. The maximin rule selects the "least worst 
alternative" in the multidimensional decision space of deontological, goal-achievement and 
stakeholder values.  
 
The ethical decision-maker can be characterized as having the ability to take multiple 
perspectives and make appropriate balance across diverse value dimensions.   
 
Modern organizations should develop a critical sensitivity to and empathy toward human and 
non-human beings with which they share a common environment. 
        
 
1 Perverse Decisions of Modern Organizations  
 
Modern organizations are disembedded from their environmental and social contexts and 
usually consider the natural environment and human persons as mere means to accomplish 
their own purposes and goals. The dominating self-centered orientation of modern 
organizations produces ecological destruction and human deprivation.  
 Perverse decisions of modern organizations appear in such phenomena as decision 
under risk and discounting in space and time. Prospect theory and the general theory of 
discount can help us in describing and analyzing these phenomena.  
 
1.1 Risky Decisions 
 
The prospect theory developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky is an empirically 
well-established theory that gives us a realistic picture about the main regularities of decision-
making under risk. (Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. 1979)   
 Prospect theory states that decision-makers display risk aversion in choices involving 
sure gains. For example, they prefer gaining USD 1,000 surely over gaining USD 10,000 with 
a 10 % chance. 
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 Prospect theory also states that decision-makers display risk seeking in choices 
involving sure losses. For example, they prefer losing  USD 10,000 with a 10% chance over 
losing  USD 10,000 surely. 
 From prospect theory it follows that decision-makers are more sensitive to losses than 
to gains. This means, for example, that they prefer gaining USD 10,000 surely and, at the 
same time, losing USD 100,000 with a 10% chance over losing USD 10,000 surely and, at the 
same time, gaining USD 100,000 with a 10% chance. 
 Risky decisions made by corporate and governmental decision-makers often endanger 
the safety and integrity of the natural environment and human populations. The so-called 
catastrophic risk is a closely related phenomenon. The probability of catastrophes caused by 
modern, large-scale technologies is usually low but never zero. And the possible negative 
consequences are horrifying: irreversible destruction of ecosystems and enormous losses of 
human life. 
 The most tragic examples of this kind of ecological and human tragedy are the 
Chernobyl nuclear reactor explosion in 1986 that sent nuclear fallout across Europe, 
increasing human and animal cancers, and the wreck of the Exxon Valdez oil tanker at the 
Alaskan coastline in 1989 that produced the largest oil spill in American history. 
 
1.2 Discounting in Space and Time  
 
Decision-makers usually overvalue things here and now in comparison with things far and 
later. This phenomenon is produced by the mechanism of discounting.  
 According to the general theory of discount, decision-makers discount gains that are 
distant in space and time. For example, they prefer gaining USD 1,000 here and now over 
gaining  USD 1,000 far and later. "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush"   
 According to the general theory of discount, decision-makers put off negative things 
till the morrow because they discount losses that are distant in space and time. For example, 
they would rather lose USD 1,000 far and later than here and now.  
 From the general theory of discount it follows that decision-makers undervalue both 
gains and losses that are distant in space and time. For example, they prefer gaining USD 
1,000 here and now and losing USD 1,000 far and later over losing USD 1,000 here and now 
and gaining USD 1,000 far and later.   
 Decision-makers use discount rates to value things distant in space and time. The 
present value of a thing is usually calculated as follows: 
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T = t / (1 + α) x   
 
where T is the present value of the thing t, x is a measure of the distance of t in space or in 
time, and α is the discount rate, which is usually between 5 % and 15 %.   
 If the distance of a thing in space and/or time is great enough then its present value 
becomes extremely small. Also, the present value depends on the applied discount rate: the 
greater the discount rate, the smaller the present value. The present value of a thing is 
determined by the applied discount rate and its distance in space and time.  
 Discounting in space and time may produce negative consequences in corporate and 
governmental decision-making. Decision-makers, who strongly discount things in space and 
time, are interested in neither the solutions of long-range ecological and human problems, nor 
the global impacts of their activities on the natural environment and human communities.  
 The international trade in hazardous wastes is an illustrative case in point. American 
and West-European countries transport and dump hazardous wastes in distant and less-
developed Third World countries, without displaying any interest in the future ecological and 
human health impacts of these materials. (Sing, J.B. and Lakhan, V.C. 1989)  
 
1.3 Self-Centered Organizations    
 
By combining the main lessons of prospect theory and the general theory of discount we can 
arrive at a better understanding of the self-centeredness of modern organizations.  
 Modern organizations favor sure gains here and now and unsure losses far and later 
while disfavoring sure losses here and now and unsure gains far and later. For example, they 
would rather gain USD 1,000 here and now for sure and lose USD 10,000 far and later with a 
10% chance rather than lose USD 1,000 here and now for sure and gain USD 10,000 far and 
later with a 10% chance.  (Table 1) 
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Table 1  Self-centered Choices of Modern Organizations    
 
 
 sure, here and now  unsure, far and later 
gains favored disfavored 




Modern organizations experience a sharp distinction between themselves and their natural and 
social environments. In Gregory Bateson's words, this state of mind can be called "non-
participating consciousness." In such a state of mind the subject  "in here" sees himself or 
herself as radically disparate from the object he or she conceptually confronts "out there." In 
this view the self is created by the subject-object dichotomy, the distance between nature and 
ourselves. (Berman, M. 1981) 
 The self-centered orientation of modern organizations is deeply rooted in their non-
participating consciousness, which leads to environmental destruction and human deprivation. 
 
 
2 The Principle of Responsibility  
 
The outstanding German-American philosopher Hans Jonas has injected the problem of 
moral responsibility into contemporary moral discourse. Jonas published the German version 
of his theory of responsibility in 1979 under the title “Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch 
einer Ethic fur die Technologische Zivilization.” The rewritten and enlarged English edition 
was published in 1984 under the title “The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an 
Ethics for the Technological Age.” (Jonas, H. 1979, 1984) 
 Jonas argues that the nature of human action has changed so dramatically in our times 
that a correspondingly radical change in ethics is called for as well. He emphasizes that in 
previous ethics “all dealing with the nonhuman world, that is, the whole realm of techne was 
ethically neutral. Ethical significance belonged to the direct dealing of man with man, 
including man dealing with himself: all traditional ethics is anthropocentric. The entity of 
‘man’ and his basic condition was considered constant in essence and not itself an object of 
reshaping techne. The effective range of action was small, the time span of foresight, goal-
setting, and accountability was short, control of circumstances limited.” (Jonas, H. 1984. pp. 
4-5.) 
 According to Jonas new dimensions of responsibility emerged because nature became 
a subject of human responsibility. This is underscored by the irreversibility and cumulative 
character of the human impact on the living world. Knowledge, under these circumstances, is 
a prime duty of man and must be commensurate with the causal scale of human action. We 
should seek “not only the human good but also the good of things extrahuman, that is, to 
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extend the recognition of ‘ends in themselves’ beyond the sphere of man and make the human 
good include the care of them.” (Jonas, H. 1984. pp. 7-8.) 
 For Jonas, an imperative responding to the new type of human action might run like 
this:  “Act so that the effects of your actions are compatible with the permanence of genuine 
human life.” Or, expressed negatively: “Act so that the effects of your actions are not 
destructive to  the future possibility of such life.” (Jonas, H. 1984. p. 11.) 
 Jonas argues that our duties to future generations and to nature are independent of any 
idea of rights or reciprocity. Human responsibility basically consists of a non-reciprocal duty 
to guarding beings. 
 Jonas states that the necessary conditions of moral responsibility are as follows: “The 
first and most general condition of responsibility is causal power, that is, that acting makes an 
impact on the world; the second, that such acting is under the agent’s control; and the third, 
that he can foresee its consequences to some extent.” (Jonas, H. 1984. p. 90) 
 Jonas emphasizes the fact that prospective responsibility is never formal but always 
substantive. “I feel responsible, not in the first place for my conduct and its consequences but 
for the matter that has a claim on my acting.”  For example “the well-being, the interest, the 
fate of others has, by circumstance or by agreement, come to my care, which means that my 
control over it involves at the same time my obligation to it.” (Jonas, H. 1984: p. 92. & p. 93.) 
 Jonas differentiates between natural responsibility on the one hand and contractual 
responsibility on the other. “It is the distinction between natural responsibility, where the 
immanent ‘ought-to-be’ of the object claims its agent a priori and quite unilaterally, and 
contracted or appointed responsibility, which is conditional a posteriori upon the fact and the 
terms of the relationship actually entered into.” (Jonas, H. 1984: p. 95.) 
 The parent and the statesman are presented as ideal types of natural responsibility and 
contractual responsibility, respectively. The parent is responsible for his or her child not 
because of the child's own will or even contrary to it. However, the responsibility of the 
statesman comes from the political contract that he or she has established with his or her 
constituencies.  
 There are important similarities between Jonas’s theory of responsibility and the ethic 
of care described by Carol Gilligan in her best-seller book “In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development” (Gilligan, C. 1982) 
 Gilligan characterizes the morality of women as an ethic of care. “The ideal of care is 
thus an activity of relationship, of seeing and responding to need, taking care of the world by 
sustaining the web of connection so that no one is left alone.” The ethic of care “is the wish 
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not to hurt others and the hope that in morality lies a way of solving conflicts so that no one 
will be hurt.” Women consider the inflicting of hurt as “selfish and immoral in its reflection 
of unconcern, while the expression of care is seen as fulfillment of moral responsibility.” 
(Gilligan, C. 1982: p.62., p.65., and p.73.) 
 Gilligan states that men and women represent two different moral ideologies: the ethic 
of rights and the ethic of care, respectively. Separation is justified by an ethic of rights while 
attachment is supported by an ethic of care. “The morality of rights is predicated on equality 
and centered on the understanding of fairness, while the ethic of responsibility relies on the 
concept of equity, the recognition of differences in need. While the ethic of rights is a 
manifestation of equal respect, balancing the claims of other and the self, the ethic of 
responsibility rests on an understanding that gives rise to compassion and care.” (Gilligan, 
C.1982:p.165.)  
 Gilligan does not argue for the superiority of women’s morality. The two disparate 
modes of moral experience are connected in mature morality. “While an ethic of justice 
proceeds from the premise of equality - that everyone should be treated the same - an ethic of 
care rests on the premise of non-violence - that no one should be hurt.” In maturity “both 
perspectives converge in the realization that just as inequality adversely affects both parties in 
an unequal relationship, so too violence is destructive for everyone involved.” (GILLIGAN, C. 
1982: p. 174.) An advanced concept of responsibility integrates the reverence for rights 
represented by men and the non-violence of care represented by women.     
 
3 Making Ethical Decisions  
 
In an economic context Kenneth E. Goodpaster offers the most operationalized model of 
ethical decision-making. (Goodpaster, K. E. 1983)   
 
3.1 Rationality and Respect 
 
Goodpaster proposes understanding moral responsibility as a combination of two basic 
components, namely rationality and respect.  
 
Rationality involves the following attributes: 
 
(i) lack of impulsiveness; 
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(ii) care in mapping out alternatives and consequences; 
(iii) clarity about goals and purposes; 
(iv) attention to details of implementation.  
 
Rationality described by attributes (i),...,(iv) greatly differs from the rationality postulate of 
mainstream economics that requires consistent utility maximisation. The rationality concept 
used here is process-oriented and does not require maximizing anything.  Max Weber’s 
concept of ‘zveckrationalitat” and Herbert Simon’s notion of procedural rationality are closely 
related to it.  (Weber, M. 1921-1922, Simon, H.A. 1978)  
 Respect is the other component of moral responsibility.  For Goodpaster, respect 
means a special awareness of and concern for the effects of one’s decisions and policies on 
others, beyond seeing others as merely instrumental in accomplishing one’s own purposes.  
This is respect for the lives of others and involves taking their needs and interests seriously, 
not simply as resources in one’s own decision-making but as limiting conditions, which 
change the very definition of one’s habitat from a self-centered to a shared environment.  
(Goodpaster, K.E.  & Matthews, J.B. 1982.  p. 134.) 
 Respect described in this way has a basic similarity to the altruistic behavior that is 
widely discussed in psychology, economics, and sociology. The prominent Italian economist 
Stefano Zamagni offers a clear conceptualization of altruistic behavior. He defines individuals 
as altruistic when they feel and act as if the welfare of others were an end in itself; that is, as 
something of relevance independently of its effects on their own well-being. If your concern 
for the welfare of others is merely instrumental in promoting your own longer-term ends and 
ceases once these ends can be more easily pursued in some other way, you are an enlightened 
self-interested person, not a genuine altruist. (Zamagni, S. 1992) 
 
3.2 The 3 R Model   
 
Goodpaster’s model is a consequentialist system interwoven with agent-relative elements. 
Agent-relativity means that the model permits the decision-maker to produce less than the 
overall best consequences for the stakeholders in order to realize her or his own goals and 
purposes. The model also extends to incorporating agent-relative constraints that would 
simply forbid certain courses of action for the decision-maker.   
 Consequentialist models can be criticized on consequentialist as well as non-
consequentialist grounds.  
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 In complex economic and political decision situations phenomena can emerge that 
make the consequentialist evaluation of an act very difficult, if not impossible. The most 
important of these phenomena are marginal contributions, uncertain consequences, and 
distant effects.  
 There are cases where the agent’s choice produces only marginally negative 
consequences to the stakeholders but the cumulative and/or aggregate effect of this kind of 
behavior is detrimental to them. The ecologist Garret Hardin’s famous “tragedy of the 
commons” model describes such situations. (Hardin, G. 1968) 
 If some consequences of an act are rather uncertain then the decision-makers tend to 
neglect them in their consequentialist considerations. This may lead to inadequate accounting. 
Similarly, if the consequences of an act are distant in space and/or time then the decision-
makers discount them at a positive (and sometimes very high) rate. Hence consequences 
beyond the normal space and time reference of the decision-makers are usually 
overdiscounted.  
 The phenomena of marginal contributions, uncertain consequences, and distant effects 
present decision traps from which there is no escape within the consequentialist framework. 
 Consequentialist models are also criticized from a deontological point of view. 
Deontological ethicists have developed strong deontological arguments that overwrite 
consequentialist considerations. The decision-maker may have deontological reasons not to 
do certain things even if they would lead to good overall consequences. Deontological reasons 
limit what we may do to others or how we may treat them. (Nagel, T. 1986) 
 It is better to define respect exclusively in terms of altruistic orientation toward the 
affected parties. Also, we can introduce deontological considerations as a separate component 
into the model of ethical decision-making.  In this way we can get a more robust model in 
which ethical decision-making is characterized by the making of a synthesis of deontological 
considerations, rationality in goal-achievement, and respect for the stakeholders. This model 
of ethical decision-making can be called the 3 R model, since its components are reverence & 
rationality & respect. (Zsolnai, L. 1997) (Figure 1)  
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3.3 Complex Decision Situations 
 
The following features can characterize complex business or public administration decision 
situations. First, at least two decision alternatives are available for the decision-maker; that is, 
she or he can choose among different courses of action. Second, in the decision situation 
ethical norms apply which represent duties of the decision-maker. Third, the decision-maker 
has goals that she or he wants to achieve in the decision situation. Finally, different 
stakeholders are present that can be affected by the outcome of the decision. 
 We can formalize the above-listed elements of complex decision situations as follows: 
 
(1) A1,...,Ai,...,Am  (m ≥ 2)  
 
This means that at least two decision alternatives are feasible for the decision-maker. 
 
(2) D1,...,Dk,...,Dp  (p ≥ 1)  
 
This means that at least one ethical norm applies in the choice situation. 
 
(3) G1,...,Gj,...,Gn  (n ≥ 1)  
 
This means that the decision-maker has at least one goal that she or he wants to achieve. 
 
(4) S1,...,Sq,...,Sr   (r ≥ 1)  
 
This means that at least one stakeholder is present in the choice situation. 
 Ethical decision-making involves finding and implementing the decision alternative 
that best corresponds to the idea of moral responsibility in the given context. Which is the 
appropriate decision rule for making an ethical decision?  
(5) A*   =   Ω (A1,...,Ai,...,Am) 
where A* refers to the selected alternative. 
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Deontological value can be defined as the value of a decision alternative seen from the 
perspective of the applicable ethical norms. The deontological values of the decision 
alternatives A1,...,Ai,...,Am can be represented by a vector as follows: 
 
(6) d   =   [D(A1),...,D(Ak),...,D(Am)]    
 
D(Ai) can be measured on the ordinal scale [1, 0, -2]. This means that D(Ai) = 1 if Ai is right 
regarding the ethical norms; D(Ai) = 0 if Ai is neutral regarding the ethical norms; and D(Ai) 
= -2 if Ai is wrong regarding the ethical norms.        
 The deontological values of decision alternatives depend on two things: 
 
(i)  Which are the considered ethical norms? 
(ii)  How are the importance weights assessed?  
 
The answer to these questions is that an ideal third party, the so-called ‘impartial spectator,’ 
should define the set of applicable ethical norms and assess the corresponding weights in the 
given situation. That no such ideal third party exists necessitates real world surrogate. 
Possibilities include some of the newer institutions of deliberative democracy such as the 
citizens’ jury, for example.  
 It is natural that the decision-maker considers the value of the decision alternatives 
with a view toward the achievement of her or his own goals. In classical decision theory this 
was the only dimension in which courses of action were evaluated and decided upon. 
  Goal-achievement value can be defined as the value of a decision alternative seen 
from the locus of the achievement of the decision-maker’s goals. The goal achievement value 
of the decision alternatives A1,...,Ai,...,Am can be represented by a vector. 
 
(7) g   =   [G(A1),...,G(Ai),...,G(Am)]  
 
G(Ai) is measured on the ordinal scale [1, 0, -2]. This means that G(Ai) = 1 if Ai is useful 
regarding the goals; G(Ai) = 0 if Ai is neutral regarding the goals; and G(Ai) = -2 if Ai is 
useless regarding the goals. 
 
The important question is to what extent the decision-maker is free to choose her or his goals 
and the weights she or he attributes to the chosen goals. 
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 Decision-makers are embedded in interpersonal relations and the social context, so it 
is realistic to presuppose that decision-makers set goals and assign weights to them with  
reference to those communities and organizations in which they happen to exist and function. 
 Stakeholder value can be defined as the value of a decision alternative seen from the 
perspective of the stakeholders. The stakeholder values of decision alternatives 
A1,...,Ai,...,Am can be represented by a vector: 
 
(8)     s   =     [S(A1),...,S(Ai),...,S(Am)] 
 
S(Ai) can be measured on the ordinal scale [1, 0, -2]. This means that S(Ai) = 1 if Ai is good 
regarding the stakeholders; S(Ai) = 0 if Ai is neutral regarding the stakeholders; and S(Ai) = -
2 if Ai is bad regarding the stakeholders. 
 Weighing of the stakeholders poses difficult questions. Any distribution of weights 
generates some form of justice or injustice among the stakeholders. We can agree with 
Michael Walzer that an adequate conception of justice is necessarily plural, that is, 
multidimensional.  (Walzer, M. 1993) 
 Two variables can be considered as means by which stakeholders can be weighed 
against one another. One variable is their stake while the other is their size. The greater the 
stake and the size of a stakeholder, the greater the weight that should be attributed. Notice that 
there is no such thing as an absence of weighing if at least two parties are present. If one does 
not attribute weights to the parties then she or he considers them as being equal. Having no 
weights means having equal weights.   
Holding (6), (7), and (8) together we can get a multiple evaluation of the decision alternative 
Ai.  
 
(9)      v     =     [D(Ai), G(Ai), S(Ai)]  
 
The first component of the vector is the deontological value of the decision alternative; the 
second component is the goal-achievement value of the decision alternative, while the third 
component is the stakeholder value of the decision alternative. 
 The vector v represents a simultaneous evaluation of the same course of action from 
different perspectives. The deontological value is assessed from the perspective of an 
impartial observer; the goal-achievement value is assessed from the perspective of the agent; 
and the stakeholder value is assessed from the perspective of the affected parties. (Figure 2)   
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The ‘ethical calculus’ advanced here is very close to Amartya Sen’s ideas about the moral 
evaluation of acts.  He wrote in his influential book On Ethics & Economics: “To get an 
overall assessment of the ethical standing of an activity it is necessary not only to look at its 
own intrinsic value (if any), but also its instrumental role and its consequences on other things. 
(...) The advantages of consequential reasoning involving interdependence and instrumental 
accounting, can then be combined not only with intrinsic valuation, but also with position 
relativity and agent sensitivity of moral assessment.”  (Sen, A. 1987. p. 75. and p. 77.)  Our 
moral accounting system tries to do exactly this job. 
 
3.4 The Maximin Principle 
 
A matrix that contains multiple evaluations of all the decision alternatives available for the 
decision-maker can provide an overall picture about the choice situation. 
 
   D(A1),.....,G(A1),....,S(A1) 
    .        .                . 
(10)  V     =   D(Ai),.....,G(Ai),.....,S(Ai) 
    .                 .                . 
    D(Am),....,G(Am),...,S(Am) 
 
The matrix V may present value conflict. The best strategy is to maintain the complexity of 
the decision situation and try to find an optimal compromise among diverse value dimensions. 
Trying to balance different values against one another is an essential strategy in complex 
choice situations. The maximin rule can do the required job quite well. It implies the 
maximization of the minimum payoff of decision alternatives.  
 Austrian logician Earnest Zermello first described the maximin rule in 1912. In his 
groundbreaking Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, Hungarian-American 
mathematician John Von Neumann developed the rule further. (Von Neumann, J. & 
Morgenstein, O. 1944)  
In complex decision situations the rule of making ethical decisions is stated as follows:  
 
(11) A*  =   maximin [D(Ai), G(Ai), S(Ai)] 
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Ethical decision-making demands the selection of the least worst alternative in the decision 
space of deontological, goal-achievement, and stakeholder values - in the sense that the 
minimum value of the selected alternative is greater than the minimum value of any other 
alternative available for the decision-maker in the given situation. The comparability of D(Ai), 
G(Ai), and S(Ai) is provided by the fact that they are measured on the same ordinal scale [1, 0, 
-2]. 
 If there are two decision alternatives A1 and A2, then the responsible decision is A1 if 
and only if:  
 
(12) min   [D(A1), G(A1), S(A1)]     >     min   [D(A2), G(A2), S(A2)] 
 
The underlying principle of responsible decision-making is that the decision-maker should 
find an optimal compromise among the applicable ethical norms, her or his own goals, and 
the interests of the stakeholders.  
 The ethical decision defined by (11) provides a Pareto optimal result in the 
multidimensional decision space. This means that given the set of decision alternatives it is 
not possible to increase their value in one value dimension without decreasing their value in at 
least one other value dimension. In this sense the alternative chosen by the maximin rule 
dominates all the other alternatives. 
 
4  Analyzing the World Bank Case 
 
A provocative case concerning the World Bank environmental policy is useful in  
demonstrating how the ethical decision-making model works.  
 In the early 1990s, some economic advisors of the World Bank were proposing that 
the organization should encourage increased migration of dirty industries to less-developed 
countries. The argument was as follows: “The measurement of the costs of health-impairing 
pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this 
point of view a given amount of health-impairing pollution should be done in the country with 
the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages. (...) The costs of pollution 
are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments of pollution probably have very low cost. 
(...) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have 
very high income-elasticity. The concern over an agent that causes a one-in-a-million in the 
odds of the prostate cancer is obviously going to be much higher in a country where people 
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survive to get prostate cancer than in a country where under-5 mortality is 200 per thousand. 
Also, much of the concern over industrial atmospheric discharge is about visibility-impairing 
particulates. These discharges may have very little health impact. Clearly, trade in goods that 
embody aesthetic pollution concerns could be welfare enchanting.” (The Economist, February 
8, 1992, p. 66.) 
 In this case, there are wide variety of stakeholders because not only citizens of 
developed and less-developed countries are affected by the World Bank environmental policy, 
but also the natural environment and future generations. The policy options (alternatives) are 
as follows: 
 
A1   =   encouraging the migration of dirty industries to LDCs 
A2   =   not encouraging the migration of dirty industries to LDCs 
 
The most relevant ethical norm that applies here is fairness. (D) It is formulated by Hausman 
and McPherson as the “pay-your-way” principle, which requires locating dirty industries so 
that those who derive the largest benefits from industries endure most of the pollution costs.” 
(Hausman, D.M. & McPherson, M.S. 1996: p. 204.) 
 
 The declared goal of the World Bank is to enhance global welfare. (G)  
 
 The most important stakeholders can be identified as citizens of the developed 
countries (S1), dirty industries in the developed countries (S2), citizens of the less-developed 
countries (S3), the natural environment affected by dirty industries in the developed countries 
(S4), the targeted natural environment in the less-developed countries (S5), and future 
generations (S6). 
 From a deontological perspective alternative A1 is certainly wrong while alternative 
A2 is certainly right because the latter corresponds to the norm of fairness and the former 
violates it. Using the ordinal scale of [1, 0, -2] we can calculate the deontological values of 
A1 and A2 as follows: 
 
D(A1)   =   -2 
D(A2)   =    1   
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Alternative A1 can be useful for the goal of enchanting global welfare with probability p. 
Alternative A2 might be useless for the achievement of this goal with probability q. Using the 
ordinal scale of [1, 0, -2] we can calculate the goal-achievement values of A1 and A2 as 
follows: 
 
G(A1)   =   1(p) -2 (1-p) = 3p -2 
G(A2)   =   1(1-q) -2 (q) = 1 -3q  
 
Migration of dirty industries to LDCs would be good for the citizens of developed countries 
(S1), for the industries themselves (S2), and for the natural environment affected by those 
industries in the developed countries (S4). However, it would be bad for the citizens of less-
developed countries (S3), for the targeted natural environment in the less-developed countries 
(S5), and for future generations (S6) since environmental pollution is much more controllable 
in the developed countries than in the less-developed countries. 
 Using the ordinal scale [1, 0, -2] the stakeholder values of A1 can be calculated as 
follows: 
  
S1(A1)   =    1 
S2(A1)   =    1 
S3(A1)   =   -2 
S4(A1)   =    1 
S5(A1)   =   -2 
S6(A1)   =   -2 
 
This policy option is neutral for stakeholders S1,...,S5 since it does not change the present 
status quo. However, future generations (S6) could benefit from keeping dirty industries in the 
developed countries by forcing them to innovate and to become more environmental friendly. 
 For this reason the stakeholder values of alternative A2 can be calculated as follows:  
 
S1(A2)   =   0 
S2(A2)   =   0 
S3(A2)   =   0 
S4(A2)   =   0 
S5(A2)  =    0 
 20
S6(A1)   =   1  
 
The question remaining is how to weight stakeholders S1,...,S6: 
 Let v1,...,v6  be importance weights attributed to the stakeholders. On the basis of 
inter-species and inter-generational justice we can argue that equal weights should be 
attributed to nature, society, and future generations. This implies that v1 + v2 + v3  =  v4 + v5  
=  v6. We do not discriminate between citizens of the developed countries and citizens of the 
less-developed countries, consequently v1 =  v3. Similarly, we do not discriminate between 
the natural environment in the developed countries and the natural environment in the less- 
developed countries, consequently v4  =  v5. Considering that almost everybody is served by 
dirty industries, they can get a weight similar to citizens of the developed countries: v1 = v2.  
 It is required that 
∑ vi   =   1  ( i = 1,...,6) 
 
Hence we get  
v1 = 1/9; v2 = 1/9; v3 = 1/9; v4 = 1/6; v5 = 1/6; v6 = 1/3  
 
 Aggregate stakeholder values of the two alternatives are as follows:  
S(A1)   =   - 5/6  ≈ - 0,83 
S(A2)   =     1/3  ≈  0,33  
 
Table 3 shows the different payoffs of the two policy options.  
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             -2             3p –2             -0,83  
A2 alternative 
 
              1             1 – 3q              0,33 
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Multiple evaluations of the alternatives are provided by the following vectors: 
 
V(A1)   =   [-2, 3p -2, - 0,83] 
V(A2)   =   [ 1,  1 -3q,   0,33]  
 According to the maximin rule A2 is better than A1 since min (V(A2) >   min (V(A1). 
The worst component of V(A1) is –2 while the worst component of V(A2) is 1-3q, and the 
latter is greater than the former holding that 1 > q > 0.  
 The World Bank should not encourage migration of dirty industries to less-developed 
countries. Encouraging migration of dirty industries to less-developed countries is 
unacceptable from the deontological perspective and also negative from the stakeholder 
perspective, so some questionable welfare improvement cannot compensate for the violation 
of ethical norms and vital stakeholder interests. The rejection of the policy option is also 
justifiable even if citizens of the less-developed countries get full monetary compensation 
from citizens of the developed countries. 
   
3  Conclusions 
 
The procedural model of ethical decision-making can be summarized as follows: 
 
(I) Framing of the decision situation by 
 (i) identifying the applicable ethical norms; 
 (ii) mapping out the affected parties; 
 (iii) defining goals and generating alternatives. 
 
(II) Multiple evaluation of the available alternatives regarding 
 (i) the ethical norms; 
 (ii) the goals to be achieved; 
 (iii) the affected parties. 
 
(III) Finding the least worst alternative in the multidimensional space of deontological, 
goal-achievement, and stakeholder values. 
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The ethical decision-maker can be characterized as having the ability to take multiple 
perspectives and make optimal balance across diverse value dimensions. He or she is a 
properly socialized individual who has developed reflexivity regarding the ethical norms of 
her or his society and displays empathy toward others. 
 The components of the 3 R model of ethical decision-making, namely reverence for 
the ethical norms, rationality in goal-achievement, and respect for others can be considered as 
virtues. These are motivational dispositions that determine ways individuals tend to act in 
certain sorts of circumstances. The view of reverence, rationality, and respect as virtues is 
consistent with the Aristotelian notion that virtues are ‘aretai’, that is, excellencies that result 
from a person’s self-cultivation. (PINCOFFS, E.L. 1992: p. 1286)           
 Perverse decisions of modern organizations can be avoided by employing ethical 
decision-making. The preservation of the natural environment and the provision of the good 
life for present and future generations require critical sensitivity to the ethical norms of 
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